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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore 
Stump, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Pp. viii and 302. $59.95 (cloth), $17.95 (paper). 
ANDREW J. DELL'OLIO, Hope College 
This excellent collection of essays on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas 
constitutes another very fine volume in the Cambridge Companion series. 
As the preface to the book indicates, the series in general aims "to provide 
expository and critical surveys of the work of major philosophers" with 
substantial enough bibliographies to "serve as a reference work for stu-
dents and nonspecialists." The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas ably fulfills 
this commitment to students and non-specialists with essays by the leading 
scholars of the philosophy of Aquinas, written in a manner easily accessi-
ble to novices but without sacrificing scholarly sophistication. These 
essays will also be of genuine interest to specialists who will find in its 
pages careful and original expositions of Aquinas's thought, informed by 
the latest scholarship, and engaged in the latest interpretive debates. A 
specific aim of this volume is to render the philosophy of Aquinas more 
accessible to contemporary philosophers so that it may, in the words of its 
editors, "help speed the process of engaging philosophers as well as stu-
dents in the study and appreciation of Aquinas's philosophy" (p. 2). All of 
the essays achieve this aim, some especially well. 
One nice feature of this collection is the wide scope of its articles, 
including entries on "Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers" (David 
Burrell) and "Biblical commentary and philosophy" (Eleonore Stump), 
topics not customarily treated in volumes of Aquinas's philosophy. In 
addition to a helpful introduction by editors Kretzmann and Stump, the 
volume's other essays cover the following more standard topics: 
"Aquinas's philosophy in its historical setting" (Jan Aertsen), "Aristotle 
and Aquinas" (Joseph Owens), "Metaphysics" (John Wippel), 
"Philosophy of Mind (Norman Kretzmann), "Theory of Knowledge" 
(Scott MacDonald), "Ethics" (Ralph McInerny), "Law and Politics" (Paul 
Sigmund), "Theology and philosophy" (Mark Jordan). Despite the 
range of its selections, the relationship between philosophy and theolo-
gy is a recurring theme within this collection. This is as it should be 
since the book is an anthology on the philosophy of an eminent 
Christian theologian. In this review, I will limit my discussion primarily 
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to those articles that have the most to say on this shared theme, although 
this should not suggest to the reader that there is no other issue in this 
collection worthy of similar attention. 
The volume's introduction (Kretzmann and Stump) sets the tone for 
the book and stands on its own as an informative essay. It is partly an 
apologetic for the importance of studying medieval philosophy, and 
Aquinas in particular, and partly a primer on the state of medieval 
philosophical texts, the scholastic method, and the connection between 
philosophy and theology in the medieval period. All of this provides a 
useful context for appreciating the ways Aquinas is typical of his age 
and the ways he is atypical, particularly on the issue of the relationship 
between philosophy and theology. 
On this issue, Aquinas is portrayed as primarily a theologian whose 
thought is largely guided by theological concerns but not restricted to 
them. An example of an area of Aquinas's thought that is not primarily 
guided by theological concerns is his philosophical theology. Aquinas's 
motivation in sorting out these matters, we are told, is "fundamentally 
philosophical" (p. 9). And even when Aquinas's motivation is theologi-
cal, "what he produces in acting on that motivation is thoroughly, inter-
estingly philosophical" (p. 9). 
In making these claims, Kretzmann and Stump clearly hope to con-
vince the reader that he or she should take Aquinas's philosophy "as 
seriously as that of any other philosopher of the first rank" and ought 
not to regard him as solely a theologian, suggesting instead that we see 
"his ostensibly theological works as also fundamentally philosophical" 
(p. 10). According to Kretzmann and Stump, Aquinas's theology is 
"fundamentally philosophical" since it contains discussions on matters 
that would interest non-religious philosophers, and it proceeds in the 
rational, analytical manner that we associate with the philosophical 
enterprise. As Kretzmann and Stump point out, "Aquinas is at least as 
concerned as we are with making sense of obscure claims, exploring the 
implications and interrelations of theoretical propositions, and support-
ing them with valid arguments dependent on plausible premises" (8). 
But it would certainly be odd if, qua theologian, Aquinas, or anyone else 
for that matter, were not concerned with these basic rudiments of intel-
lectual inquiry. The attempt at clarifying obscure claims, exploring 
implications and interrelations of propositions, and employing reasoned 
argumentation is hardly the province of philosophy alone. 
In an implicit recognition of how difficult it is to disentangle the 
philosophical and theological in Aquinas's thought despite their efforts, 
Kretzmann and Stump simply describe Aquinas as a "philosopher-the-
ologian" (p. 9). While this may be a fair enough characterization of 
Aquinas, it hardly clarifies matters. In their brief overview, Kretzmann 
and Stump avoid facing the main interpretive issue, namely, whether or 
not Aquinas presents a philosophy, even what might be called a 
"Christian" philosophy, that stands independently of his theology. 
Admittedly this is a large matter to resolve in an introduction to a book 
of this kind, but acknowledging that it is a matter not easily resolved 
would not have been inappropriate. 
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Jan Aersten (" Aquinas's philosophy in its historical context") contin-
ues the theme of the complex connection between philosophy and theol-
ogy in Aquinas and reiterates the perspective stated in Kretzmann and 
Stump's introduction. Aersten makes the point that while Aquinas is 
foremost a Christian theologian, he was still noted in his own day for 
"writings of a philosophical nature" (14), and that his theology is 
scholastic precisely because it incorporates philosophy. Aersten goes on 
to make the important point that Aquinas's theological framework was 
as influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy as it was by Aristotelian phi-
losophy. For example, Aertsen notes that a key original feature of 
Aquinas's commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the standard 
theological exercise for master's degree candidates in the thirteenth cen-
tury, was its circular Neoplatonic organization depicting the emergence 
of creatures from God (exitus) and the return of creatures to God (redi-
tus), an organization Aquinas would use again in the Summa Theologiae. 
Although Aersten rightly emphasizes the Neoplatonic as well as 
Aristotelian elements in Aquinas's thought, his portrayal of Aquinas is 
still somewhat misleading in its emphasis on his philosophical rational-
ism. For example, while Aertsen is correct to maintain that Aquinas fol-
lows Aristotle in believing that "all human beings by nature desire to 
know" (p. 27), it would be a mistake to think that he is wildly optimistic 
about our ultimate success in this pursuit. Twice in this very volume 
contributors remind the reader of Aquinas's claim in Collationes super 
Credo in Deum that "our cognition is so feeble that no philosopher has 
ever been able to investigate completely the nature of a fly" (cf. 
Kretzmann, "Philosophy of Mind", p. 157, fn. 56; and Jordan, "Theology 
and Philosophy", p. 234). Nor does Aquinas's belief in our natural desire 
to know warrant the too facile contrast Aersten makes between Aquinas 
and Augustine on the legitimacy of purely philosophical inquiry (p. 28). 
While, as Aersten points out, Augustine does condemn the vice of curios-
ity as "a vain desire cloaked in the name of knowledge" (Confessions X, 
35), it is not the desire to know per se that is condemned but rather its 
mere semblances (simulacra), distorted by human depravity in one way 
or other. Nor is Aquinas himself blind to the deleterious effects of origi-
nal sin on human reason (Summa Theologiae, laIIae, q. 85, a. 3) and the 
need for grace to assist it and bring to completion what our natural desire 
to know alone cannot achieve (Summa Theologiae, la, q. 12, a. 4). 
Aertsen does recognize some of these aspects of Aquinas's thought 
and includes them in his discussion of the limits of philosophy and the 
necessity of theology (pp. 32-34). Yet the portrait of Aquinas presented 
by Aertsen is that of a philosopher who regards theology as a hand-
maiden to philosophy; theology serves the aims of philosophy and 
comes to the lady's aid only when her powers grow weak. It would be 
more accurate to portray Aquinas as fundamentally a theologian who 
incorporates Aristotle and Greek philosophy into an overall Augustinian 
theological framework, enriching that framework by a philosophy that is 
itself transformed and enhanced in its new context. 
In his contribution to this volume (IITheology and Philosophy"), 
Mark Jordan paints a more realistic portrait of the relationship between 
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philosophy and theology in Aquinas. In Jordan's account the very ques-
tion of their relationship is misleading for it supposes that Aquinas 
"would admit to having two separate doctrines" (p. 232), one philosoph-
ical and one theological. Jordan believes Aquinas would never make 
such an admission and that he would be "scandalized" to hear himself 
referred to as a philosopher, "since this term often had a pejorative sense 
for thirteenth-century Latin authors" (p. 232). Jordan does not deny that 
Aquinas writes philosophically, or on philosophical matters, or that he 
uses philosophy in his theology. His point is that Aquinas's original 
philosophical work must be seen within the context of his career as a 
theologian, serving the aims of theology rather than its own indepen-
dent ends. 
Thus, for Jordan's Aquinas, the relation of philosophy to theology is 
one of "subjugation" (d. Kretzmann and Stump's introduction). 
Philosophy may be said to be subjugated to theology not only in that it 
serves theology's ends, but also in that theology serves as a corrective to 
philosophy. And as Jordan points out, for Aquinas, theology guides and 
corrects philosophy not only in matters of doctrine but also matters of 
practice. For in proceeding "according to Christ" and not the ways of 
men, "the impure motives of philosophy," vanity among them, "may be 
transformed into the motives of the Christian believer" (p. 236). 
Jordan's essay is itself a much needed corrective to the too frequent 
attempts by philosophers such as Kretzmann and Stump to extract a 
Thomistic philosophy from the heart of Aquinas's theological, and 
indeed, spiritual project. Jordan is especially good in his treatment of 
Aquinas's conception of virtue (pp. 236-241), showing how it is the 
divinely infused virtues, so often ignored by contemporary philosophers 
who turn to Aquinas in the hopes of recovering an ethics of virtue, 
which are central in Aquinas's account since they alone completely satis-
fy the true notion of virtue as he conceives it. 
Jordan's essay is useful in helping us reframe the question of the rela-
tionship between philosophy and theology in Aquinas. His suggestion 
that "the question must be reformulated so that it asks about theology's 
transforming incorporation of philosophy" (p. 248) should prove fruitful 
in directing further attempts at understanding central concepts of 
Aquinas. Yet Jordan should be more careful than to make rather loosely 
the assertion that, for Aquinas, "a Christian theology well done ought to 
speak more and better about matters of concern to philosophy than the 
philosophers themselves can say" (p. 248). For surely Aquinas would 
acknowledge that there are some "matters of concern to philosophy," 
the nature of valid inference, to name an obvious example, for which 
Christian theology has little if anything to say. 
Other articles in this volume do an excellent job of making it clear 
what difference the theological context of Aquinas's thought makes to 
his philosophy. Burrell ("Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers"), for 
example, explains how "existence" becomes a central concept in philoso-
phy only when classical Greek ontology is revised in light of the theo-
logical doctrine of the creation, and that Aquinas achieves greater clarity 
here than his Islamic predecessors precisely because he understands the 
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esse of things not in terms of a received "accident" but as an "act" of 
existing identified in terms of a "relation-to-a-transcendent-agent" (p. 
69). Similarly, Owens ("Aristotle and Aquinas") sees "a radical differ-
ence in the philosophical thinking of Aquinas and that of Aristotle, 
despite Aquinas's use of the Aristotelian vocabulary" (40) owing to the 
different cultural contexts of the two thinkers. Aquinas's medieval 
Christian enculturation not only influences the topics of his philosophi-
cal reflection but also the philosophical meanings of the terms he inher-
its from his pagan Greek masters. The concept of being, for instance, 
undergoes dramatic changes as it passes from Aristotle to Aquinas for 
whom "the primary instance of being" (p. 46) is God, the first efficient 
cause of all other things. Actuality is no longer understood, as it is in 
Aristotle, in terms of a thing's finite form or sensible nature, but rather 
in terms of a thing's "existence" which is always distinct from its nature 
or essence. And the only being in whom the distinction between essence 
and existence does not hold is God, who as creator, exists essentially and 
is the efficient cause of all that exists. 
McInerny ("Ethics") also gives a balanced account of the relationship 
between philosophy and theology in Aquinas's ethics, although he is 
primarily concerned with providing an overview of central notions in 
Aquinas's moral theory. The essays by Kretzmann ("Philosophy of 
mind", MacDonald ("Theory of knowledge") and Sigmund ("Law and 
politics"), also cover more straightforwardly philosophical matters. 
MacDonald's essay is particularly good and raises the level of discussion 
on Aquinas's epistemology by bringing it into dialogue with contempo-
rary debates. Sigmund's essay, while adequate for this volume, is rather 
brief and cursory, although it alone among the contributions includes 
some discussion of Aquinas's legacy. An unfortunate omission from 
this volume is an essay on Aquinas's aesthetics. 
All in all, this book is first-rate and deserves to be a standard refer-
ence work for the philosophy of Aquinas. It is highly recommended for 
all students of Aquinas's thought regardless of level of expertise. The 
fact that the book features a diversity of opinion by prominent scholars 
of Aquinas makes it a particularly valuable collection. This is especially 
true for non-specialists, who will be introduced not only to differing 
interpretations of specific doctrines of Aquinas, but in the guise of the 
question of the relationship between philosophy and theology, will be 
introduced to differing interpretations of the very characterization of his 
thought. Such a reader will be led to ask important questions about the 
place of Aquinas in the history of philosophy: Is Aquinas a "Christian 
philosopher" as well as a Christian theologian? If so, just how does the 
Christian faith inform his philosophy, and just how does his philosophy 
inform his Christian faith? And just what, if anything, distinguishes his 
Christian philosophy from his theology? Far from being just a matter of 
historical interpretation, the sorting out of these questions has important 
contemporary implications, particularly for those who are presently 
struggling with what it means to be a Christian philosopher. 
